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THE SHAREHOLDER'S ROLE IN CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property,' Professors
Berle and Means concluded that the corporation should serve the
interests of all society and not solely the interests of its share-
holders. This concept was a break from traditional corporate
theory and the beginning of the theory of corporate social respon-
sibility. The purpose of this article is to assess the modem share-
holder's role in the implementation of this doctrine.
Because Berle was one of the first to consider the role of the
shareholder in enforcing the corporation's responsibility to
society, this article will begin with a brief review of his ideas with
respect to this problem. The writings of other scholars in the
corporate area will then be examined to discover their assump-
tions regarding the shareholder's interest in the modem corpo-
ration and their conclusions regarding the shareholder's role in
enforcing corporate social responsibility. Finally, the validity of
these assumptions and conclusions will be analyzed in the light of
recent developments in the area.2
II. BERLE: THE EARLY DOCTRINE
In 1932 Berle and Means proclaimed the separation of own-
ership and control in the modern corporation3 From this premise
the authors reached two related conclusions. First, because of the
wide dispersion of stock ownership shareholders could no longer
be certain that the corporation would run primarily in their in-
terest. Because the shareholder was now unable to enforce his
1 A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932)
[hereinafter cited as THE MODERN CORPORATION].
2 This article is not primarily concerned with the economics of the corporate system;
rather, its primary focus is the social and political power of large corporations. Although
some authors have been critical of corporate reformers who ignore economic consid-
erations in their discussions of corporate power [See Manne, The 'Higher Criticism' of the
Modern Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 430 (1962)], the better view is that the
social and political powers of corporations, although perhaps the results of economic
power, are problems in themselves and should be addressed as such. See Adelman, The
Two Faces of Economic Concentration, 21 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 117, 126 (1970):
Perhaps bigness is much more important, sociologically or politically, than is
revealed by measuring economic quantities to understand market facts. If
that is the case, it should be studied directly, and not be confused with
economic concentration, a market phenomenon.
a THE MODERN CORPORATION 4.
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demands, management had assumed a position of absolute power.
Second, the separation of ownership and control changed the
concept of property. Berle believed that in the past ownership of a
business enterprise had always involved both risk-taking and man-
agement responsibilities. However, in the modem corporation the
shareholder had become solely a risk-taker, leaving the manage-
ment of the enterprise to the directors and/or officers. 4 The share-
holder was now the owner of what Berle termed "passive proper-
ty. ' ' 5 When the shareholder lost control and responsibility over his
property, he also lost the right to demand that the corporation be
operated in his sole interest. Having been released from share-
holder control, the corporation was now free to serve the public
interest.
6
This was clearly a break from traditional corporate theory un-
der which management was required to seek maximum profits for
the benefit of the corporation's shareholders. 7 This expectation of
maximum profit had served not only as the unifying interest
between corporate investors and managers but also as a legal
standard against which courts could measure management per-
formance.
8
Although Berle was certain that the profit-maximization theory
could be abandoned because the shareholders were no longer
entitled to be the sole beneficiaries of the corporate trust, he was
uncertain about the abandonment of profit maximization as a legal
norm. Thus, when Professor Dodd asserted that management
should act as a trustee for both the shareholder and the public, 9
4 Id. at 338.
5 Id. at 346- 347.
6 Id.at 355-356.
7 For a discussion of the traditional theory see Manne, Current Views On The 'Modern
Corporation,' 38 U. DET. L.J. 559 (1961). In Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477
(1958) the author asserts that the proper function of managers is to maximize the economic
position of shareholders and nothing else." In terms of modern corporate literature, Manne
admits that his position "approaches the radical." Manne, note 7, at 573.
8 For a strong argument in favor of the retention of profit maximization as a legal norm
see, Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in
THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 46 (Mason ed. 1960).
Professor Dodd had advanced the view that corporations have a social responsibility
as well as a profit-making function. See Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932). He had also found that management was
"free from any substantial supervision by shareholders .... ," and that managers, in fact, did
not act as though maximum stockholder profit was the sole object of their activities. Id. at
1147. Thus, with management and public opinion recognizing a corporate social respon-
sibility, Dodd concluded that management should be the trustee not only of the share-
holders but also of the public. Id. at 1148. In asserting this view, he criticized Berle's
earlier position, expressed in Corporate Powers as Powers In Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1049 (1931), that management should act in the sole interest of the shareholders, and
declared that management instead should be freed of the traditional profit-maximization
norm. 45 HARV. L. REV. at 1148.
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Berle responded that Dodd's assertion was based upon abstract
theory, admitting, however, that he had previously subscribed to
that view. 10 Berle had now concluded that the traditional legal
norm of profit maximization could not be abandoned until a clear
and enforceable scheme of responsibility to someone else devel-
oped.
Nevertheless, in 1954, Berle discovered that corporate manage-
ment has assumed a social responsibility. 1' Citing A.P. Smith
Mfg. Co. v. Barlow,x 2 where the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that the Company directors' $1,500 contribution to Princeton
University constituted legitimate corporate action,13 Berle de-
clared that management was no longer bound to the legal norm of
profit maximization and conceded that Dodd had won the de-
bate.1 4 Berle later stated that by 1954 he had realized that be-
cause of the threat of government intervention management was
forced to take a business statesmanship position' 5 and that the
focus of public opinion had led management to become more
trustworthy and develop higher standards of conduct.' 6
Berle knew that this was a departure from the traditional theory
of profit maximization. 17 But in supporting his business states-
manship position against attack by traditional theorists, Berle
claimed that by being forced into the social statesmanship posi-
tion; management was concomitantly forced to deviate from the
profit-maximization norm.' 8 That management might be unfaithful
to its shareholders in assuming its new position did not alarm
Berle, for, as he had earlier suggested,' 9 stock was merely passive
property with no responsibility of, or right to, ownership.
Probably one of the most widely accepted explanations for
10 Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers 'Are' Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV.
1365 (1932).
1 1 A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954).
12 13 N.J. 145, 98 A.2d 581 (1953), appeal denied, 346 U.S. 861 (1953).
13 The court stated that "corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well as
private responsibilites as members of the communities in which they operate." 13 N.J.
145, 154, 98 A.2d 581, 586.
14 BERLE, supra note 1I, at 169.
15 Berle, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 443
(1962).
'6 Id. at 437.
17 As Berle stated:
In assuming responsibility for certain aspects of community life, in making
gifts to charity, in playing any role in economic statesmanship not dictated by
market considerations, the corporate management traitorously departs from
the discipline of seeking the highest possible profit, regarded by classicists as




19 THE MODERN CORPORATION 346- 347.
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Berle's change of position begins with his concern over the ab-
sence of machinery, legal or otherwise, for enforcing a legitimate
community demand determinative. 20 In replying to Dodd in 1932,
Berle had expressed his fear that if management were no longer
controlled by the legal norm of profit maximization, it would
attain a position of absolute power, especially since there was no
alternative scheme of effective control. However, one of the pre-
dominant themes of The Modern Corporation was that through
the dispersion of stock ownership shareholders had become so
impotent that managers had attained a position of absolute power.
Thus, if Berle believed that management was in economic fact no
longer subject to shareholder demands for profit maximization, he
had little ground to assert that the loss of the legal norm of
profit maximization would result in any further loss of control.
Nor can it be said that Berle's change of position resulted from
the development by 1954 of an alternative scheme of control.
Public opinion can hardly be called a clear and enforceable
scheme of responsibility to community demands. 21 However,
apart from the threat of government interference, Berle suggested
no other enforcement machinery.22
To this writer, the key point of dispute between Berle and
Dodd appears to have been over what corporate managers in fact
did. Because Dodd believed that managers assumed a social re-
sponsibility position and that public opinion supported that posi-
tion, he concluded that management should be freed of the
profit-maximization norm in order to pursue it. Berle, on the other
hand, while believing that corporatios owed a duty to the public
interest, found that management had not assumed such a role
and therefore concluded that the traditional norm would have to
be applied until either the courts or the community forced man-
agement to assume such a role. When in 1954 Berle found that
20 See Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964); Katz, Responsibility and the Modern Corporation, 3 J.
LAW AND ECON. 75 (1960).
21 In responding to Berle's belief in the "higher standards" of managers as a means of
social control, Professor Kaysen notes:
It is sufficient to remark that there is, at least as yet, neither visible mech-
anism of uniform training to inculate, nor visible organization to maintain and
enforce, such standards....
Kaysen, The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 85, 104 (E. Mason ed. 1960). Even Berle admitted:
This is not to suggest that we have reached first-rate solutions. Planning,
stabilization, continuity, and provision for the future can be better taken care
of than they are now.
Berle, supra note 15, at 443.
22 Berle later stated that he opposed Dodd simply because he thought management was
not qualified to assume a social responsibility in 1932. Berle, supra note 15, at 443.
FALL 197 11
Journal of Law Reform
managers had assumed the business statesmanship position, the
debate ended.
Thus, Berle's change in position may have been merely an
admission that managers do make decisions affecting the public
interest, that corporate directors do make decisions on social and
moral grounds,23 and that the only effective means of controlling
these persons is public opinion.
To assert that the main dispute between Berle and Dodd was
whether managers in fact assumed a business statesmanship posi-
tion is not to reduce a great legal debate into a sophomoric
squabble. One of the key aspects of the current debate over the
means of enforcing corporate social responsibility concerns the
nature of the shareholder's interest. Depending upon whether the
shareholder is in fact solely interested in profits or is also con-
cerned with the social power of corporate management, the share-
holder's role in a scheme of corporate social responsibility will be
radically different.
III. THE SHAREHOLDER'S ROLE IN CORPORATE
POLICY-MAKING
In 1932, when Berle recognized only the legal norm of profit
maximization, the shareholder was not included in any proposed
scheme of social responsibility. Believing that management had
not yet assumed a business statesmanship position and finding
managers to be untrustworthy and unqualified, Berle was willing
to wait until a group outside the corporate framework could
effectively present their claims and have them enforced.
When Berle later recognized that management had assumed a
business statesmanship position, he acquiesced in its assumption
of this role. In so doing, he changed many of his earlier assump-
tions. Managers were now more trustworthy, more qualified, and
were legally freed of the profit-maximization norm. 24 Implicit in
2 Berle, supra note 15, at 444:
The fact is that boards of directors or corporation executives are often faced
with situations in which quite humanly and simply they consider that such is
the decent thing to do and ought to be done .... They apply the potential
profits or public relations tests later on, a sort of lefthanded jursification in
this curious free-market world where an obviously moral or decent or hu-
mane action has to be apologized for on the ground that, conceivably you
may somehow make money by it.
24 The fact that managers were capable of assuming the role and were legally free to do
so did not answer Berle's question: "Why do these men have decision making power
rather than someone else?" Berle, supra note 15, at 444. Berle could only answer that
managers have assumed this role, and it works fairly well. Thus, he concedes that Manne
correctly asserted that "Berle has legitimized them on the firing line, so to speak, by
finding that they are performing their social function well and that that is sufficient."
Manne, supra note 2, at 418.
I VOL. 5 :1
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Berle's acquiescence must have been the belief that there was still
no method by which a group outside the corporation could
present its claims. A "clear and enforceable scheme of respon-
sibilities to someone else" never materialized.
In retrospect, Berle is probably more correctly characterized as
a "managerialist. '- 25 His concern over the uncontrolled power of
management and his fear of freeing management from the
profit-maximization norm were replaced by the knowledge that
managers had become business statesmen and that their power to
act in the public interest had been realized. At the same time, the
shareholder had become unimportant, for he no longer assumed
responsibility for or control of the corporate enterprise, his only
risk was that his shares would make or lose money, he was no
longer relied on for a supply of capital,2 6 and the corporate elec-
tions in which he participated had become a mere ritual. It is not
surprising that the shareholder should have no role in a scheme of
social responsibility, when it is doubtful that he has any impact on
the corporation at all.
Since the shareholders were thought to be the owners of the
corporation, Berle's assessment of their role was reached through
the application of traditional property concepts. Under this ap-
proach the shareholders failed miserably, and Berle concluded
that they no longer deserved to be the sole beneficiaries of the
corporate trust. His conclusion was, in effect, that shareholders
were not owners of the corporation but merely owners of shares.
It is here that Berle's logic breaks down. The shareholder's
interest in the corporation cannot be determined by applying
property concepts. If shareholders are not the owners of the
corporation they cannot be condemned for failure to assume the
risks of operating the enterprise. If they are merely owners of
2 See Eisenberg, Legal Roles of Stockholders and Management in Modern Corporate
Decision-Making, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 21 (1969). In discussing those who are concerned
with the political and social power of corporate managers, Eisenberg has classified their
reform programs, including their proposals regarding the shareholder's role, into three
schools of thought: shareholder democracy, client-group participation, and managerialism.
Id. at 15-27.
26 In THE MODERN CORPORATION, Berle found that although the large corporations
reinvested their earnings, such reinvestment only furnished a quarter of their growth, while
the "bulk of their growth came almost entirely from new issues of stock or other secu-
rities." THE MODERN CORPORATION 280. However, later Berle noted that out of an
aggregate of 150 billions of dollars spent for capital expenditures between 1946 and 1953,
only 6 percent was raised by the issuance of stock. BERLE, supra note 1I, at 39. Indeed,
Berle subsequently stated:
In fact, if the stock market shut down completely (as it did in 1914), or if all
of their stock were miraculously wiped out, it would not have a great effect
on their operations, though it might have tangible effect on the number of
buyers ready, willing, and able to buy their cars or washing machines.
Berle, supra note 15, at 446.
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shares they have fulfilled the ownership function by assuming the
risk of loss of their capital investment. 27
Nevertheless, the shareholders' rights and interests, not as
owners of the corporation, but as the owners of shares, have
received legal sanction. When a person buys a share he is given
certain rights which are set out by the corporate charter, the
statutes of the state of incorporation, and the federal securities
acts and regulations. Thus, to conclude that under property theory
shareholders have no rights or interests in the corporation as
owners does not necessitate the conclusion that they have no
interest in the corporation at all.
Whether the shareholder should be allowed to participate in a
scheme of corporate social responsibility is another matter. Under
a property theory there is no justification for such participa-
tion-the shareholder has no interest in the corporation. Berle at
one time argued that the general community should be able to
present their demands to the corporation; and there are those who
continue to claim that consumers, workers, and other such groups
should be allowed to participate in corporate decision-making. 28
Again, this cannot be justified on a property theory. This is not to
say that there is no means available for presenting certain types of
claims and of having them enforced, for it would seem an obvious
point, especially to one believing in a wide dispersion of stock
ownership, that a group of consumers or workers could purchase
a single share and use the available statutory machinery to present
their claims.
Berle, however, failed to consider this point because he as-
sumed that shareholders were only interested in profits. In The
Modern Corporation he stated that the shareholder had only two
interests: the return on his capital, and the return of his capital. 29
While Berle was willing to allow the consumer to participate in
enforcing corporate responsibility, once the consumer purchased
a share he was disqualified, for then he became a shareholder who
was only interested in profits. The roles of manager, shareholder,
and non-shareholder were mutually exclusive.
Berle is not alone in his definition of the shareholder's interest
and his conclusion as to his limited role in enforcing corporate
responsibility. Professor Manning, by adhering to the same defini-
tion, has reached the same conclusion.30 Manning begins by stat-
27 Berle, supra note 15, at 445.
2
8 See Chayes, The Modern Corporation And The Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION
IN MODERN SOCIETY 25, 38-45 (E. Mason ed. 1960).
2 THE MODERN CORPORATION 121.
30 In advancing his position that the corporate constituency should be expanded to
[VOL. 5: 1
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ing the problem as one of uncontrolled power in the hands of
managers. However, he does not believe that the solution rests in
increasing shareholder power and control. Noting that in 1932
Berle and Means reported an unchecked management and impo-
tent shareholder, Manning claims that after twenty-five years of
"reform" by the Securities and Exchange Commission nothing
has changed. 31 Thus, shareholder democracy is not the answer
because it hasn't worked, and one of the reasons it hasn't worked,
Manning believes, is because the shareholder's sole interest is
profit maximization and not good management. 32 The dis-
enfranchised shareholder is relevant to the issue of corporate
responsibility only if one can assume that once shareholders re-
gain power they will control management for the benefit of all
society. However, since shareholders and the rest of society have
different interests regarding the operation of the corporation,
Manning finds no grounds upon which to make this assumption. 33
He therefore criticizes the shareholder democrats for diverting
attention from the real problem of holding business managers to a
desirable standard of responsibility and at the same time per-
petrating a fraud upon the public by leading them to believe that
management is responsible to the shareholders when, in fact, it is
responsible to no one.
Although Manning concludes that shareholders should play no
role in enforcing corporate social responsiblity, he does not share
Berle's faith in management's assumption of the role. 34 Instead,
Manning takes a cautious view of the Barlow case and the con-
cept of non-business charitable contributions. Viewing the prob-
lem as how to control an uncontrolled management, he does not
find the solution in allowing managers to assume a business states-
manship position, because he believes that "[t]he new enthusiasm
for the concept of corporate good citizenship is likely to increase
this power further." 35 Therefore, management should be held to a
include groups other than the shareholders, Chayes does not assert that such groups are
entitled to representation as owners or under a theory of property interests. Instead, they
have a right to participate in corporate decision-making because they have a "significant
common relation to the corporation and its power." Chayes, supra note 28, at 41.
31 Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477, 1485 (1958).
32 Id.
33 Id.:
As with other shareholders, the primary interest of the investment fund must
be income and profit-taking-not the abstraction of good business manage-
ment.
34 Manning Corporate Power And individual Freedom: Some General Analysis and
Particular Reservations, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 38, 41 (1960).
35 In this regard, Manning is not alone. See Eisenberg, supra note 25, at. 180- 181:
There is no reason to believe that present-day management would use in-
FALL 197 11
Journal of Law Reform
clear and enforceable standard of responsibility36 like the tradi-
tional norm of profit maximization.
The shareholder democrats whom Manning so vigorously at-
tacked also assume that the shareholder's sole interest is profit
maximization. Professors Emerson and Latcham, two of the most
fervent supporters of shareholder democracy, state that the share-
holder's interest is purely economic and conclude that the SEC
regulations do a fairly good job in protecting this interest.37 They
concede that the social consequences 0f corporate policies are
beyond the scope of the proxy machinery and the shareholder's
interest but contend that a "liberal view" should be taken to allow
shareholders to consider the social effects of corporate decisions
and policies.38 This seemingly conflicting position is in part due to
the shareholder democrat's great concern with keeping control
within the corporate structure. Thus, Emerson and Latcham state:
A liberal view of the issues which stockholders may consider
does mean that these problems may receive attention from
a group with a much broader social background and objec-
tives and, yet, a group which is still within the corporate
context. Otherwise, some group outside the corporation-
notably a governmental agency-may be called upon to sup-
ply the broader outlook.39
Therefore, even if the shareholder's interest is purely economic,
he should still be allowed to participate in non-economic decisions
rather than allowing the government or someone else to exercise
the control. This position is also in line with one of the basic
tenets of shareholder democracy, that is, shareholder participa-
tion is in accord with the goals of a democratic society-a belief
which Manning expressly rejects. 40
creased power either wisely or unselfishly, and some reason to fear the
opposite.
See also Kaysen, The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?, in THE CORPO-
RATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 85, 104 (Mason ed. 1960); J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN
STOCKHOLDER 222 (1958).
36 Manning, supra note 3 1, at 1494.
37 Manning also proposed an extension of the business judgment rule to provide man-
agers with the broadest latitude in making business decisions and full disclosure to aid the
shareholders in deciding whether to sell their shares or sue for breach of management's
profit-maximization responsibility. As a further safeguard, he suggested an administrative
board to protect the shareholder's interests, and a system providing shareholders with an
easy means of withdrawing their shares. Manning, supra note 31, at 1490-91.
38 F. EMERSON and F. LATCHAM, SHAREHOLDER DEMOCRACY 149 (1954):
Shareholders are, of course, interested in their problems as shareholders, that
is, in dividends, the value of their securities, and the protection of their
proprietary interest.
39 Id. at 150.
40 Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay For Frank Coker, 72
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However, Emerson and Latcham run into further difficulties
with their assumption of the shareholder's interest. The authors
conclude that the "Wall Street Rule," which provides that the
shareholder can best influence corporate policies by selling his
shares if he becomes dissatisfied with management's policies, is an
effective method of shareholder control. 41 They recognize that
there are many flaws in the rule, such as the limitations on the
ease of withdrawal, but fail to state the greatest and most appar-
ent flaw. That is, assuming that the shareholder is only interested
in pecuniary gain, he will never sell his shares despite his opposi-
tion to management policies if they are making a profit.
In any event, the shareholder democrats conclude that share-
holders should have a role in a scheme of corporate social respon-
sibility, regardless of whether their interest is solely economic.
They believe that the proxy regulations, although presently too
limited, can be used as a proper and useful means of representing
the interests of consumers and the general public.
Perhaps the corporate reformers who are most disadvantaged
by their assumption of the shareholder's interest are those whom
Eisenberg characterizes as expounders of "client-group partici-
pation."42 This group of reformers, led by Professor Chayes,
43
claims that shareholder democracy is a sham, because the share-
holders are not under the control of the corporation to the same
degree as other groups, such as consumers and suppliers. Like
Manning, they argue that if corporate goals conflict with national
and public goals, increasing shareholder power will not resolve
the conflict, because shareholders, qua shareholders, are not con-
cerned with national goals but only with profits. Therefore, they
contend that an effort should be made to "democratize" other
groups to allow them to participate directly in business decisions
affecting the public interest.
As Eisenberg had conceded, the greatest problem facing these
"corporate democrats" is how to achieve the direct participation
YALE L. J. 223 (1962). Manning further asserts: "[W]e have enough problems in the
corporate field without importing additional nettles from the democratic political press."
Id. at 226. This is a basic theme running throughout Manning's work, and is best explained
in Manning, Corporate Power and Individual Freedom: Some General Analysis and
Particular Reservations, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 38 (1960). See also Manne, Our Two
Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259 (1967); and Manne, Some
Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1444-45 (1964). But see
Latham, The Body Politic of the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY
218 (Mason ed. 1960).
41 F. EMERSON and F. LATCHAM, supra note 38, at 151.
42 Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 16.
4 Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 25, 42-45 (Mason ed. 1960).
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of social groups in business decisions. 44 One of the many ob-
stacles in setting up such a plan involves determining the con-
stituency of each group. As an example, Eisenberg notes that
General Motors would vote in Greyhound as a supplier and in
United States Steel as a customer. A related problem is the fact
that many of the groups are interrelated. Thus, one individual or
institution could be both a supplier and consumer of the same
corporation.
4 5
Most importantly, however, the corporate democrats are handi-
capped in the implementation of their theory by their assumption
that shareholders are solely concerned with making profits. If they
did not assume that a consumer of supplier lost his identity as
such upon 'becoming a shareholder, the greatest obstacle-the
lack of a scheme of implementaion-could have been circum-
scribed by directing attention to the SEC proxy machinery and
regulations and the legal norms regulating shareholder participa-
tion.
By assuming that shareholders are only interested in profits, all
corporate reformers have been hindered in their efforts to control
the social and political power of managers. The assumption has
led them either to acquiesce in a more powerful management, to
reject the theory of corporate social responsibility entirely, or to
continue to search for an alternative scheme of presenting com-
munity demands. With the exception of the shareholder demo-
crats, all have concluded that the shareholder has no role to play
in enforcing the corporation's social responsibility.
IV. REASSESSMENT OF THE SHAREHOLDER'S
INTEREST
A. The Factual Assumption
Recent efforts of certain shareholders have made it clear that
not all shareholders are solely concerned with profit maxi-
mization. An example is the dispute between the Medical Com-
4 4 Eisenberg, supra note 25, at 18.
4 Id. The question arises, why divide into groups at all; if all society is affected why not
let all society participate? In this regard the state, as the entity best able to define the goals
of the public interest, could select the appropriate representatives. Vagts has made an
extensive study of the experiences of foreign governments in trying to extend the corpo-
rate constituency. Vagts, Reforming the 'Modern' Corporations: Perspectives from the
German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 64-87 (1966). His conclusions concerning Germany's
experience in allowing public participation in corporate management is that the govern-
ment representatives have failed to produce any substantial changes in corporate policy.
Id. at 85. The government representatives, instead of regulating the corporation, have
become regulated by it. Thus, Vagts declares that:
On the whole, one is inclined to believe that a more rational and orderly
[VOL. 5: 1
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mittee for Human Rights and the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission regarding a proposal submitted to the Dow Chemical
Company.
46
The Committee became a shareholder through a gift of a num-
ber of shares in Dow Chemical Company. At that time, the
company had a defense contract to manufacture napalm for use in
the Vietnam War. Because the manufacture and use of such a
product conflicted with its ethical goals, the Committee submitted
a proposal requesting the board of directors to propose an amend-
ment to the corporate charter prohibiting the company from fur-
ther production of napalm.
The efforts of the Committee to have its proposal included in
the company's proxy material cannot be squared with the assump-
tion that the shareholder is only concerned with dividends and
profits, for the Committee was not motivated by a purely econom-
ic interest. In a letter addressed to the Secretary of Dow Chem-
ical Company, the national chairman of the Committee stated that
"our objections to the sale of this product are primarily based
on the concerns for human life inherent in our organization's
credo. ' ' 47 He went on to state that the organization also believed
that the manufacture of napalm was bad for the company's busi-
ness and was adversely affecting its public image; 48 however,
these were merely secondary reasons for urging the adoption of
the proposal. Regardless of whether the Committee expected to
make a profit on their shares, it did not lose its identity as a
human rights organization upon becoming a shareholder.
Another example of shareholders whose sole concern was not
with profit maximization is the Project on Corporate Respon-
sibility. 49 The Project, referring to it as "[a] newly formed organ-
ization which will explore methods by which corporations can be
made more responsive to public and social needs .... -50 sought to
have nine proposals included in General Motors' proxy materials
at the annual shareholders meeting in 1970. 51 The proposals con-
development of economic law is apt to be achieved by pursuing the American
pattern of open regulation rather than the German form of operating through
undisclosed negotiations between private and public representatives.
Id. at 87.
46 Medical Comm. For. Human Rights v. Securities And Exch. Comm'n., 432 F.2d 659
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 91 S.Ct. 1191 (March 22, 1971).
47 Id. at 432 F.2d 662.
48 Id.
49 See generally Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections. On Cam-
paign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 421 (1971).
50 Letter from Mr. Geoffrey Cowan to Mr. Edward B. Wallace, Feb. 6, 1970, in which
the Project submitted its first three proposals to General Motors, reprinted in 116 CONG.
REC. 4699, 4701 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1970).
51 The proposals were submitted by the Project pursuant to Rule 14a-8 of the proxy
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cerned such matters as amending the corporate charter so that
none of the purposes could be implemented "in a manner which is
detrimental to the public health, safety, or welfare," expanding the
board of directors to permit the addition of "public representa-
tives," and creating a "Special Committee for Corporate Respon-
sibility" to study the manner in which corporate decisions are
made and assess the possible adverse social impact of corporate
activities. 52 Six other proposals relating to specific areas, such as
mass transportation and air pollution, were not included in the
proxy materials because they were not proper subjects under state
law for action by security holders.
3
In light of the goals of the Project and the substantive impact of
the proposals, it is clear that the Project was not chiefly con-
cerned with either the corporation's or its own economic position.
Instead, the Project, as a shareholder of General Motors, was
concerned with the social responsibility of that corporation. In
submitting its first three proposals, the Project stated:
Both as shareholders and as members of the public we have
been concerned about the myriad ways in which General
Motors' decisions affect the lives of virtually all Ameri-
cans-in areas ranging from auto safety to repair bills, envi-
ronmental pollution, minority employment, and worker health
and safety. 54
The Medical Committee for Human Rights and the Project on
Corporate Responsibility are only two groups of shareholders
who have demonstrated an interest in the social consequences of
corporate decisions. Another such group is a coalition of black,
rules of the SEC which requires management, subject to certain exceptions, to include
such proposals in its proxy materials along with a supporting statement by the shareholder
of one hundred words or less. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1969).
52 Proxy Statement, Campaign To Make General Motors Responsibile (March 25,
1970).
53 General Motors decided not to include these proposals in its proxy materials on the
grounds that they were submitted "primarily for the purpose of promoting general econom-
ic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes" and were not "proper subjects"
under state law for action by security holders, and were thus excludable under Rule
14a-8(c)(I)(2). This decision was supported by the SEC when it advised General Motors
that it would take no action if the proposals were omitted from management's proxy
materials. Letter from Charles R. Shreve, Director, SEC to George Win. Coombe, Jr.,
Secretary General Motors Corp. (March 10, 1970).
54 Letter from Mr. Geoffrey Cowan to Mr. Edward B. Wallace, Feb. 6, 1970, reprinted
in 116 CONG. REC. E1267 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1970). A further indication of the Project's
motives can be taken from the proxy statement of the Campaign to Make General Motors
Responsible. Here, the purpose of the solicitation was declared to be to provide share-
holders with the opportunity to consider various proposals "designed to make the Corpo-
ration more responsible to the community as a whole." Proxy Statement, Campaign To
Make General Motors Responsible 2 (March 25, 1970). Campaign GM also noted that "It




Mexican-American, and women's groups in California calling
themselves Responsible Corporate Action. Upon conducting a
survey of the decision-making structures of the sixty-seven largest
California corporations, the coalition discovered that none of the
corporations' 1,008 directors were either black or Mexican-
American. And, although six of the 1,008 directors were female,
three were married to the president of chairman of the
company, and one was the daughter of the company's founder.
Responsible Corporate Action has announced that it will avail
itself of shareholder movements, such as Campaign G.M. to
achieve its goal of persuading the "California-based corporations
that 25 percent of their directors should represent blacks, Mexi-
can-Americans and women-who, when combined, make up 61
percent of the state's population."
55
Although it is perhaps too early to state that there is a trend
toward a greater social concern among shareholders regarding the
consequences of corporate decisions, it is at least clear that many
groups, concerned with the uncontrolled social and political pow-
er of managers, are turning toward the shareholder's position as a
possible solution. 56 - For those who are unwilling to acquiesce in
management's assumption of the business statesmanship position,
who are unwilling to rely on governmental regulation, and who
cannot wait until an alternative method of enforcement is estab-
lished, the shareholder's position and the SEC regulations are the
only realistic means of presenting their claims?
7
It has been contended that the Committee and the Project
submitted their proposals not because they were concerned with
such issues as shareholders, but because they were concerned
primarily as citizens or members of certain groups. In arguing
against the inclusion of the Project's proposals before the SEC,
the attorneys for General Motors asserted that the Project be-
came a shareholder solely "for the purpose of making the Propos-
als and for the primary purpose of promoting its public goals." 58
55 Power to Which People, 164 THE NEW REPUBLIC, February 20, 1971, at 9- 10.
56 For a list of the larger corporations which have been confronted by "[dissident
shareholders who questioned not profit performance but the social impact of the com-
pany's activities," see Schwartz, supra note 49, at 422.
57 As Schwartz states:
To affect national policy, the dissenters concluded, required them to influence
economic policy, and this in turn meant that they had to work within the
organizations that make such policies. Therefore, the plan evolved to oppose
corporate policies not as outsiders, but as participants in the process.
Id. at 422. The shareholder proposal rules under the SEC regulations were the means
adopted by Campaign GM and other dissenters to present their claims to the corporate
body.
58 Letter from Davis, Polk & Wardell to Ross L. Malone, General Counsel of General
Motors Corp., February 27, 1970.
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Such an allegation may indeed be factually true. Undoubtedly the
Medical Committee for Human Rights, as an organization, was
concerned with the use of napalm as an instrument of war. Like-
wise, the members of the Project on Corporate Responsibility
were concerned with the social consequences of corporate deci-
sions before they became stockholders of General Motors. How-
ever, it cannot be contended that because the Committee and the
Project were concerned with similar issues before they became
shareholders they were not acting as shareholders in submitting
their proposals. Such a conclusion is merely a reassertion of the
assumption that when a shareholder submits a proposal con-
cerning primarily social or ethical issues, he cannot be acting as a
shareholder, because shareholders are only concerned with
profit maximization. However, both the Committee and the Proj-
ect were shareholders, and as such, were more concerned with the
corporation's social responsibilities than its economic respon-
sibilities. The question is not whether the shareholders were act-
ing as shareholders in submitting their proposals, but whether
shareholders should be allowed to submit such proposals.
B. The Legal Assumption
It is insufficient to assert that the assumption that shareholders
are solely interested in profit maximization is no longer valid
factually, for this assumption is also based in law. By applying the
standard of profit maximization the courts have vitalized the as-
sumption.
First contact with the theory of profit maximization usually
occurs in the study of economics and not in the study of corporate
law. In most introductions to the economic system, the student
will find the statement that "[e]ntrepreneurs aim at the max-
imization of their firms' profits. .. -59 By applying this basic.
assumption to others regarding supply and demand, the economist
is able to predict market behavior in a capitalist economy. Thus,
profit maximization is basically an economic predictive used to
determine and assess the behavior of industries within the market
system.
With economists reporting that corporations seek to maximize
their profits, it was not illogical for the courts to adopt the pre-
dictive as a legal norm, especially in light of the assumption that
shareholders were solely concerned with receiving the greatest
return on their capital. Thus, when the Michigan Supreme Court
59 C. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS 40 (4th ed. 1963).
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held in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co. ° that Ford could not pursue a
policy of reducing the price of cars for the purpose of sharing its
profits with the public because it would violate the profit-
maximization norm, it did so on the ground that it was pro-
tecting the shareholders' interest as well as upholding the goals of
the capitalist system. As the courts began to assume that corpo-
rations acted in a manner so as to maximize their profits, the legal
norm became a bar to shareholder participation in corporate deci-
sion-making. 61 As long as the managers were, in good faith, mak-
ing decisions designed to maximize the corporation's profits, the
courts reasoned that the shareholder had little cause for concern,
since his interest was being fully protected.
One manifestation of the courts' thinking was their adoption of
the "business judgment rule" under which they refused to hear
cases disputing business decisions. The rule was, in part, an
expression of the idea that in a competitive free-enterprise system
business managers should be relatively free of governmental regu-
lation, and was based upon the belief that corporate managers
should be protected from liability in the event that a good faith
decision resulted in economic disaster. To be valid, the rule must
also have been based on the assumption that in pursuing
profit maximization, the corporation was fulfilling its repsonsibil-
ity to its shareholders. As Manne states:
Since the corporate system is premised on some coincidence
of interest between managers and shareholders, the decision-
making process must be one which on its face can be pre-
sumed to be in the interest of shareholders.62
However, if the shareholder is no longer solely concerned with
maaximizing his return, a decision based upon profit maximization
will not necessarily be in the shareholder's interest. Further, if, as
Berle thought, managers are no longer making decisions on a
profit-maximization basis, the premise of some coincidence of
interest between managers and shareholders is undermined, and
the rule loses its validity. By applying the rule in such a case, a
court would be refusing to review a non-profit-maximizing deci-
sion on the ground that it was a profit-maximizing decision pro-
tecting an interest which, in fact, the shareholder had disclaimed.
60 204 Mich. 459, 170 NW. 668 (1919).
61 As Vagts stated:
It is quite evident.., that, with the prevalence of a benign judicial attitude
towards the disinterested business judgment of management, many actions by
directors not in fact based on profit motives have gone unchecked.
Vagts, supra note 45, at 36-37.
62 Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259,
271 (1967).
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The court in the Dow case was faced with such a situation,
except instead of deciding whether to apply the business judgment
rule, the court was faced with construing the scope of the "ordina-
ry business" limitation of 17 C.F.R. § 240, 14a-8(c)(5). There the
shareholders sought judicial review of the company's refusal to
include their proposal requesting that the company cease the
manufacture of napalm in its proxy material. The company re-
fused to include the proposal on the ground that it was not a
"proper subject" for shareholder action under section 14a of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Specifically, it urged that the
proposal was excludable as motivated by general political and
moral concerns under rule 14a-8(c)(2) and as relating to ordinary
business operations under rule 14a-8(c)(5).
Under the traditional norm of profit maximization the determi-
nation of the products which a corporation shall manufacture
would be considered a business decision in which the managers
would be entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule.
This is, in effect, what Dow managers were asserting. However,
in the Dow case, the court was faced with a situation in which the
managers declared that the decision to manufacture napalm was
not an economic decision but was one based on morality. As the
court noted:
The management of Dow Chemical Company is repeatedly
quoted in sources which include that company's own publica-
tions as proclaiming that the decision to continue manufac-
turing and marketing napalm was made not because of busi-
ness considerations, but in spite of them; that management in
essence decided to pursue a course of activity which gener-
ated little profit for the shareholders and actively impaired the
company's public relations and recruitment activities because
management considered this action morally and politically
desirable. 63
Under the traditional norm of profit maximization the court would
have been justified in declaring, as in the Dodge case, that man-
agement, by making such a decision, had violated the norm and
their responsibility to the shareholders. However, in Dow the
shareholders had expressly disclaimed a profit-maximization mo-
tive. Instead, they contended that the proposal was submitted
because of their moral and ethical beliefs concerning the use of
napalm. Thus, the legal norm of profit maximizatioa was not
applicable. The court, therefore, declared that management was
6 432 F.2d 659, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 91 S.Ct. 1191 (Mar. 22, 1971).
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not "more qualified or more entitled to make these kinds of
decisions than the shareholders .. ."64 and remanded the case to
the Securities and Exchange Commission for a redetermination of
the shareholder's claims.
It is unlikely that many managers will now contend that a
particular business decision was based primarily on social or
moral grounds. However, most business decisions probably con-
tain some elements of a social or moral belief. Thus, there may be
many cases, like Dow, where the traditional norm can no longer
be used to decide the issue.
Finally, the validity of profit maximization as an economic pre-
dictive has also come under an increasing wave of attack. Many
economists now contend that corporations do not pursue a
profit-maximization policy, but, instead, proceed on a theory of
sales or growth maximization or a satisficing policy.6 5 Thus, the
validity of profit maximization as a legal norm is being severely
challenged. Its validity as an economic predictive is being ques-
tioned, and it can no longer be assumed that profit maximization
is in accord with the interests of the shareholders.
V. CONCLUSION
Most corporate reformers have addressed themselves to the
problem of the uncontrolled power of corporate managers. Gener-
ally, they have expressed concern over the political and social
power of management and the vast social consequences of busi-
ness decisions. Believing that managers owe a duty to society as a
whole, they have sought to find the best method of implementing
the theory of corporate social responsibility. In this quest they
have indulged in certain assumptions regarding corporate behav-
ior. As has been shown, the most prevalent assumption is that the
shareholder is only interested in profit maximization.
The profit-maximization assumption has led many corporate
reformers to conclude that the shareholder has no role to play in
enforcing a scheme of corporate social responsibility. This, in
turn, has led them either to acquiesce in management's position of
power by calling it business statesmanship or to reject the entire
theory of corporate social responsibility and advocate a strict
adherence to the legal norm of profit maximization. Those who
cannot accept either position continue to search for an enforce-
64 Id.
'See J. BAUMOL, BUSINESS BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND GROWTH (1967); and H. LIEBEN-
STEIN, ECONOMIC THEORY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS(1960).
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able method by which society can assert its demands. It is time
that the reformers reassess their assumptions.
If the modern shareholder is willing to assert non-economic
claims on the corporation, and if various community groups are
willing to become shareholders to assert these claims, more atten-
tion should be directed toward the means by which they can do
so. A recent example in this regard is provided by a bill, in-
troduced by Senator Muskie, designed to amend section 14(a) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to allow shareholders to
submit proposals on political or social matters within the control
of the corporation.66 As Senator Muskie has stated:
One way to increase the effectiveness with which corpo-
rations serve society is to increase the voice of shareholders
on issues which affect them both as owners of corporations
and as citizens in their everyday lives. By providing another
channel for shareholders to direct their corporations to ad-
vance the general welfare, this bill attempts to improve corpo-
rate responsiveness to social and environmental issues. 67
If the shareholders are willing to play a role in enforcing corporate
responsibility, it is the duty of corporate reformers to insure that
they are able to do so. The scheme of shareholder enforcement
established by the SEC regulations should, therefore, be asserted
in relation to corporate norms in order to allow these shareholders
to actively participate in enforcing management's social respon-
sibility. If management has been legally freed of the profit-
maximization norm, it is time to assert that shareholders should
also be freed.
- Thomas H. Hay*
66 S. 4003, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (June 23, 1970). For a discussion of the bill and further
proposals for reforming the SEC machinery, see Schwartz supra note 49, at 520-31.
67 116 CONG. REC. S-9549 (daily ed. June 23, 1970).
*J.D. 1971, University of Michigan.
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